Jus Ad Bellum

Was the war against Iraq justified?

In continuation with our recent U.S. foreign policy-minded blogs and episodes, I wanted to write about the war that changed the course of U.S. politics in recent history – The Iraq war. Clearly, the war on Iraq was one of the most controversial chapters of the United States’ foreign policy in recent memory. The United States, along with the limited military help from the United Kingdom and 29 other countries, invaded Iraq in 2003. Shortly after the invasion, many started questioning whether the war on Iraq was ever justified. Much has been said and written about this war, however, I thought it would be interesting to evaluate whether it was justified from a theoretical standpoint.

It is difficult to firmly decide whether entering the war is justified or not. Nevertheless, the contemporary principles of Jus Ad Bellum are a respectable set of criteria that determine what is a just war. In this blog, I intend to argue that the war on Iraq was unjust because it did not meet the criteria of a just war under the Jus Ad Bellum principles: right authority, right intention/just cause, probability of success, proportionality, and last resort.

The first principle of this just war under the Jus Ad Bellum principles is the right authority. It stipulates that war must only be declared by a legitimate official and done so publicly. This code of ethics considers sovereign nations as legitimate actors in the international scene. Thus, the declaration of a just war by a given nation must follow all its legalities in order to start the war. A violation of this principle would be, for example, a military authority of a given state starting a war without following the legitimate judicial processes or a head of state starting a war without publicly announcing it.

In the United States, the constitution reserves the power and the authority to start a war to the legislative branch. However, there are some emergency military powers given to the president as the head of the executive branch and the commander in chief of the military. Taking this into account, the war against Iraq was started by the legitimate national authorities and within the confines of proper legal procedures given that the resolution for the use of military force was passed by the legislative branch in October 2002. Nevertheless, the war in Iraq lacked legitimacy on the international scene. This is in consideration of the international guidelines provided by the charter of the UN. According to the charter of the UN, war is only permissible for reasons of self-defence. The reason for self-defence was also given by the Bush administration as a rationale for war. However, there was little evidence linking Iraq to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Therefore, the war on Iraq meets the first condition of a just war but it is worth noting that it lacked international legitimacy.

Secondly, the Jus Ad Bellum principle requires the presence of a just cause or, to put it otherwise, right intentions. The main argument for the war that was given by the Bush administration was that it was a matter of self-defence. Given that the United State had just witnessed the tragedies of the 9/11 terror attacks, a significant effort to counter terrorism clearly seemed appropriate. However, substantial proof is required to justify a war of this magnitude. The rationale behind the war given by the administration was to get rid of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Putting aside that the Iraq Survey Group concluded that there was no weapon of mass destruction in Iraq, the Bush administration did not have sufficient evidence to support the war on Iraq. In contrast, more evidence was laying on the other side as David Fisher and Nigel Biggar explain, “ [this] belief reflected the advice of all the relevant experts, including the UN weapons inspectors”(Fisher and Biggar 688). Despite the clear lack of evidence, the Bush administration nevertheless pursued the war. One could argue that the intentions were right given the nature of the regime at the time.

The regime in Iraq was headed by Saddam Hussein who was responsible for many human rights violations. As Beggar writes, “ Saddam Hussein’s regime was responsible for the murder of at least 400,000 of its own people in the 15 years from 1988 to 2003”(Fisher and Biggar 696). Standing up against this sort of violence is indeed a just cause. However, a primarily unilateral war effort was one of the least effective options for addressing Hussein’s abuses.

The third principle for evaluating a just war is the probability of success. By this principle, questions surrounding the effectiveness of war have to be carefully considered. The purpose of this principle is to “ [prohibit] violent conflict that would result in needless loss of life”(Schulzke 278 ). Wars have vital unintended consequences among these are civilian casualties, property destruction, economic repercussions. This principle urges actors who are willing to engage in war to consider whether the window of success is worth the collateral damage. It moves the decision-making from the domain of the abstract to the domain of the practical. Thus, the actors must consider whether the outcome of the war outweighs its consequences. To meet these criteria, the U.S. needed a reasonable chance of achieving their goals – which, at first, consisted in getting rid of Iran’s WMD and, later on, the war became about promoting democracy in Iran. Despite the United States’ enormous military prowess, the lack of multilateralism was in fact an indicator of the war’s low probability of success. Whether the goal was to disarm the Iraqi regime or to prevent any further abuse by the regime, a multilateral approach would have been more appropriate and effective. A multilateral effort would have, firstly, legitimized the efforts and, secondly, provided a larger pool of resources and intelligence.

The fourth principle of the just war is the use of proportional force. This principle requires actors to carefully assess the appropriate amount of military force. It is synonymous with the use of minimum force necessary to defeat the enemy. The use of proportional force is difficult to assess before starting a war both from the perspective of the engaged actors and the speculative actors. It is so for the former because of the secretive nature of foreign military abilities and for the latter because of the classification of information due to national security concerns. However, an effective way of knowing whether the principle of proportion was met is to look at the number of casualties.

During the Iraq war, the principle of proportionality was initially met by the United State. A close look at the war reveals that “[casualties] were much lower than in the first Gulf war. Against the limited casualties could be set the removal of the threat to regional peace and security achieved by the overthrow of Saddam’s regime and the opportunity it furnished to disarm Iraq of its WMD”(Fisher and Biggar 691). However, the number of casualties went up as the war dragged on. Fisher remarks, “ [in] the initial military campaign, the use of force was proportionate and successful. Efforts were made to minimize civilian casualties. But in the ensuing counterinsurgency operations, there have been lapses on both counts.”(Fisher and Biggar 691). As a result, the U.S. effort did not completely meet the standards of proportional use of force.

The last principle of a just war is called last resort. This principle requires that nation-states resort to war only if all the peaceful means of resolution have been employed. The Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein was already facing multiple international sanctions and was being inspected for violating its agreements to disarm. Fisher writes, “ UNSCR Resolution 1441, passed on 9 November 2002, while declaring Iraq in material breach of its disarmament obligations, had given Saddam a final chance to prove otherwise”(Fisher and Biggar 690). These efforts by the UN were not given the chance to succeed as the U.S. had already decided to invade Iraq. Furthermore, Fisher adds, “ The UNMOVIC inspectors had arrived in Iraq only on 28 November 2002 and had not yet had time to complete their work”(Fisher and Biggar 690). Although it is impossible to know to what degree the Iraqi government intended to cooperate; the results of these investigations, if carried through, could have prevented a great deal of harm.

Consequently, the United States did not meet the last resort condition. When evaluating the rationale that led to the war in Iraq, it is clear that it was unjust. The United States failed to meet most of the criteria of the Jus Ad Bellum principles. Although contested as sound guidelines to evaluate contemporary wars, these principles are effective in assessing whether a state is justified in starting a war. Other recent systems of ethics can be used to determine the nature of international conflicts. A sound example is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. The R2P principles establish the responsibility of the state towards its citizens and the responsibility of the international community towards sovereign states. Nevertheless, the war on Iraq would still be unjustified if studied under the guides of the R2P principles.

A theoretical analysis of the war does not mean that the actual effects of the war are meaningless. It is a matter of providing a conceptual framework and systemic analysis to the question of the war. We must always keep in mind that war brings real pain, suffering, and devastation to the lives of countless families. The Iraq war was not only the biggest blunder in U.S. foreign policy in the  21st century but an example of the colossal destruction that recklessness and malicious behaviour from powerful actors can cause.

Sources

Fisher, D., & Biggar, N. (2011). Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq War and reflections on Libya. International Affairs [London], 87(3), 687-707.

Schulzke, M. (2013). The contingent morality of war: Establishing a diachronic model of jus ad bellum. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 18(3), 1-21.